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maximize social welfare, the regulator must then simultaneously alleviate two 
distortions: one that comes from pollution and the other that is due to the 
environment firms' market power. We find that combining an emission tax to a 
subsidy to polluters cannot lead to first-best, while the opposite conclusion holds 
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This paper re-considers environmental subsidies in a context where polluting
firms procure their abatement goods and services from a specialized oligopoly.
To maximize social welfare, the regulator must then simultaneously alleviate
two distortions: one that comes from pollution and the other which is due to
the environment firms’ market power. We find that combining an emission
tax with a subsidy to polluters cannot lead to first-best, while the opposite
conclusion holds if the subsidy is granted instead to environment firms. When
public transfers are themselves subject to distortions, however, welfare may
be higher if only an emission tax is used.
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1. Introduction
Subsidies have long been proposed as a public policy measure to deal with environmen-
tal externalities (Pigou 1920, Lerner 1972). Critiques argue they contradict the ‘Polluter-
pays Principle’, are less eﬃcient than taxes (Fredriksson 1998), and may even encourage
the depletion of environmental resources (Kohn 1992, Barde and Honkatukia 2004), while
supporters claim they fulfill redistribution objectives (Fredriksson 1998), might acceler-
ate the transfer of cleaner technologies (Stranlund 1997), and might also enhance social
welfare when combined with taxes (Kohn 1991, Conrad 1993, Fullerton and Mohr 2002).
All the analyses so far have assumed that polluters know and pay exactly the cost of
reducing their polluting emissions. Pollution abatement good and services, however, are
now largely being delivered by a specialized environment industry. In 2005, this industry
totalled earnings of $653 billions, and this figure has been projected to reach $780 billions
by 2010.1 Several studies reveal, then, that the various segments of the eco-industry are
imperfectly competitive (Karliner 1994, Barton 1997, Davies 2002), which entails that
environment firms will usually charge a markup to their polluting clients.
The recent papers that took these stylized facts into account now suggest that tradi-
tional wisdom concerning the design and grouping of environmental policy instruments can
actually be questioned (Greaker 2004, Copeland 2005, David and Sinclair-Desgagné 2005,
Canton et al. 2007). This article thus seeks to re-examine in particular the well-known
1For data and figures concerning the environment industry and its various segments, see the reports
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Eurostat (1992, 1996 and 1999), the
World Trade Organization (1998), and Environmental Business International (2006).
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combination of a tax on polluting emissions with a subsidy. Intuitively, this mixture of
instruments might alleviate the two distortions which are present here, i.e. the one that
comes from pollution and the other that is due to the environment firms’ market power.
We will show that, because of the latter, enacting an emission tax together with a sub-
sidy to polluters cannot achieve the first-best. The opposite positive conclusion obtains,
however, if the subsidy is granted instead to environment firms. When public transfers
are themselves subject to distortions, welfare may finally be higher if only the tax is used.
The paper is organized as follows. The upcoming section presents our model. Section
3 considers next the benchmark first-best case. The policy of mixing an emission tax with
a subsidy to polluters is analyzed in section 4. Section 5 then looks at the possibility of
subsidizing instead the environment firms. Section 6 re-assesses this combination of policy
instruments if public transfers are themselves subject to distortions. Section 7 oﬀers some
concluding remarks and discusses future research topics.
2. The model
As in David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005), let us consider a representative price-taking
firm that produces one consumption good and sells it on a competitive market at unit
price P . The cost of producing quantity x of the consumption good is given by C(x); the
function C(·) is assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and convex.
While it manufactures and delivers the consumption good, the firm also generates
pollution. At output level x, the amount of polluting emissions is given by the function
e(x, a), where a represents the firm’s abatement eﬀort. To simplify the analysis without
3
losing much in realism, we shall say that abatement essentially consists in end-of-pipe
measures.2 The emission function can then be set as an additively separable expression
of the form e(x, a) = w(x) − ²(a). We suppose that w0(x) > 0, meaning that greater
production creates more pollution, ²0(a) > 0, so more abatement decreases total emissions,
w00(x) ≥ 0, so that emissions from the last unit produced increase with production, and
²00(a) < 0, meaning that abatement is subject to diseconomies of scale.
By contrast with usual economic modelling, let us now assume that the representative
polluting firm cannot make for itself the needed abatement goods and services; it must
instead procure these goods and services from a specialized eco-industry. This industry
comprises n identical firms competing à la Cournot. An individual environment firm i
incurs a cost G(ai) for delivering quantity ai of abatement goods and services, where the
function G(·) is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and convex.
Let q(a) denote the inverse demand function faced by the environment industry, where
a stands for total purchases of abatement goods and services. Each environment firm’s
profit is now given by
Πi = q(a)ai −G(ai) , i = 1, ..., n
and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium must satisfy the following first-order conditions
∂q
∂a
ai + q(a)−G0(ai) = 0 , i = 1, ..., n. (1)
2The report by the European Commission (1999), for instance, reveals that end-of-pipe activities,
such as solid waste management, waste-water treatment, air pollution control and contaminated soil and
groundwater remediation, remain by far the most significant segment of the eco-industry, accounting for
more than 60% of total industry income.
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Since all environment firms are similar, we have that ai = an at equilibrium.
3 Let a0 = ∂a
∂q
; equation (1) can now be re-written as
q(a) = G0(ai)−
a
n
.
1
a0
, i = 1, ..., n . (2)
As it is common in Cournot competition, the market price is equal to the marginal cost
plus a markup.4
This completes the basic description of the model. As a benchmark case, we shall now
briefly consider first-best production and abatement levels.
3. The first-best
Each unit of polluting emissions causes society an amount of harm v. Pollution,
however, can be regulated by a benevolent regulator who balances consumer surplus, firm
profits and pollution damages. At the first-best, the regulator would select consumption
level x and abatement eﬀort a in order to maximize the welfare function
W =
Z x
0
P (u)du− C(x)− nG(a
n
)− v[w(x)− ²(a)].
3We suppose that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. This is ensured when the profit
functions Πi are concave in ai, i.e., when we have ∂
2q
∂a2 ai + 2
∂q
∂a −G00 ≤ 0.
4The derivative a0represents the variation of demand for abatement when the price of abatement goods
and services increases; its sign is thus expected to be negative. This will be verified in the next section.
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The first-order conditions for welfare maximization are now
P (x∗)− C 0(x∗)− vw0(x∗) = 0, (3)
−G0(a
∗
n
) + v²0(a∗) = 0. (4)
According to (3), the price of the consumption good is then equal to its marginal cost plus
the amount of environmental damage due to production. Equation (4) says, furthermore,
that abatement goods and services are delivered up to the point where the marginal cost
of abatement eﬀorts meets their marginal social benefit.
With respect to first-best, a profit-maximizing polluting firm will naturally produce
too much and abate too little. This firm will behave as if solving the problem
max
x,a
π = Px− C(x)− qa , (5)
thereby selecting the output level x◦ at which the marginal production cost C 0(x◦) is equal
to the market price P , and setting abatement orders at a◦ = 0. To correct for this, the
regulator can rely on various policy instruments in order to provide proper incentives. In
the present context, David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) have examined, for instance, the
respective eﬀect of emission taxes, technical standards and voluntary approaches. The co-
existence of two distortions - the negative externality caused by pollution and the exercise
of market power by environment firms - suggests, however, that two policy instruments
should be used simultaneously. In the upcoming sections, we shall then consider specific
ways to combine a tax and a subsidy.
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4. Taxes and subsidies are for polluters
To begin with, let the regulator set a tax t per unit of emissions while granting the
polluting firm a subsidy s for each unit of abatement eﬀort. Suppose for the moment that
both the tax revenue and the subsidy are handled in a neutral way.
The representative polluter’s profit is now
π = Px− C(x)− qa− t[w(x)− ²(a)] + sa.
Its answer to this policy is then captured by the following profit-maximizing first-order
conditions:
P − C 0(xts)− tw0(xts) = 0 (6)
−q + t²0(ats) + s = 0. (7)
After comparing (6) and (7) with (3) and (4), one concludes that, in principle, the
first-best could be reached with a tax-subsidy scheme of the form
t∗ = v
s∗ = q −G0(a
∗
n
), (8)
i.e. by combining the pigouvian tax with an abatement subsidy equal to the eco-industry’s
markup at equilibrium. Equation (2) implies that the latter can be written as
s∗ =
a∗
n
(− 1
a0ts
),
where a0ts is the price-derivative of demand for abatement services when the polluter pays
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a tax t and receives a subsidy s. The term a0ts is obtained by totally diﬀerentiating
expression (7); it is actually given by
a0ts =
dats
dq
=
1− ds
dq
t²00
.
Equation (8), however, entails that ds
dq
= 1. This means that a0ts has to be close to 0, so
the subsidy s∗ should tend to +∞.
Intuitively, implementing the first-best requires that the subsidy be equal to the eco-
industry’s markup. Any increase in the price q of abatement goods and services must
therefore be exactly compensated by an augmentation in the subsidy s. As a result, the
polluter’s demand for abatement becomes insensitive to price, or the price-elasticity of
demand for abatement tends to zero. This confers maximal market power to environment
firms, who will then raise their price as long as the regulator covers the bill. This finding
constitutes our first proposition.5
Proposition 1. When abatement goods and services are supplied by an imperfectly
competitive eco-industry, taxing polluting emissions while directly subsidizing the polluter’s
abatement eﬀorts grants maximal market power to the eco-industry; the amount of subsidy
necessary to achieve the first best is then unbounded.
In practice, this situation would of course hardly be sustainable. Most constituencies
would oppose turning public funds into huge eco-industry profits, and the regulator would
5This result still holds when there is free entry in the eco-industry. A proof can be found in the
appendix.
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find it impossible to collect enough money to pay the subsidy. The regulator will then
have to put a ceiling on the subsidy, thereby limiting the eco-industry’s market power but
encouraging insuﬃcient abatement. To somewhat counterbalance this, she might increase
the tax above the pigouvian level. A second-best situation will result, with insuﬃcient
pollution abatement and consumption good delivery.
Let us now consider what appears to be the closest alternative to this policy.
5. Taxes are for polluters, subsidies go to the eco-industry
By contrast with the previous section, suppose the regulator imposes a tax t per unit
of emissions but grants the subsidy s per abatement unit to environment firms. Public
funds are again managed in a neutral way.
The representative polluter now makes profits according to
π = Px− C(x)− qa− t[w(x)− ²(a)], (9)
so its reaction is captured by the first-order conditions
P − C 0(xt)− tw0(xt) = 0 (10)
−q + t²0(at) = 0. (11)
Comparing these equations with expressions (3) and (4) suggests that the optimal tax
has to be set at the pigouvian level t = v if q = G0( a
n
).
9
Notice now that an environment firm’s profit is currently
Πi = q(a)ai −G(ai) + sai ,
so it will supply an amount of abatement goods and services ai that satisfies the equation
qs(a) = G0(ai) +
a
n
(− 1
a0
)− s . (12)
The regulator might then establish its subsidy as
s∗ =
a
n
(− 1
a0
) ,
in order for the charged price of abatement goods and services to correspond to the
marginal cost G0( a
n
).
Indeed, the first-best will be reached here with the following tax-subsidy combination
t∗ = v
s∗ =
a∗
n
(− 1
a0t
) . (13)
This scheme looks quite similar to the previous one: the proposed emission tax matches
the marginal social cost of pollution, while the subsidy corresponds to the eco-industry’s
markup. Because it is attributed to environment firms, however, this subsidy turns out
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to have an upper-bound. To see this formally, note that the denominator term a0t, which
is again the price-derivative of the polluter’s demand for abatement under a tax t and is
obtained by diﬀerentiating totally equation (11), is now given by a0t =
dat
dq
= 1
t²00 . With the
emission tax set at the pigouvian level, we have that a0t =
1
v²00 , which is generally bounded
away from 0, so the subsidy
s∗ =
a∗
n
(−v²00)
is obviously a finite quantity. This results yields our second proposition.
Proposition 2. When abatement goods and services are supplied by an imperfectly
competitive eco-industry, combining an emission tax with a limited subsidy to environment
firms can implement the first-best.
To enact this policy, the regulator must of course know the marginal social cost of
pollution v and have information about the cost G(·) and impact ²(·) of using the relevant
abatement goods and services. There might also be administrative costs in trying to
combine and coordinate instruments (see Carraro andMetcalf 2001). An important aspect
of the latter issue will now be considered.
6. Public fund transfers are costly
Let us now lift the assumption made so far that handling public funds involves no
economic distortions. Following Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), the social cost of public mon-
etary transfers will be captured by a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. When gathering tax revenues,
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a portion λ of it will be lost. Similarly, while allocating subsidies, a fraction λ of the total
will fail to reach the intended recipients.
The regulator then faces a trade-oﬀ between (1) using the emission tax only, which
leads to insuﬃcient output and abatement (see David and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2005) and
also entails a loss while collecting taxes, and (2) using a tax-subsidy scheme, which better
deals with pollution and the eco-industry’s market power but creates additional distortions
when part of the subsidies is burnt up in the allocation process.6 The former policy yields
social welfare
W t =
Z xt
0
P (u)du− C(xt)− nG(a
t
n
)− v[w(xt)− ²(at)]− λt[w(xt)− ²(at)] . (14)
The tax-subsidy combination, on the other hand, delivers social welfare levels equal to
W ts =
Z xts
0
P (u)du−C(xts)−nG(a
ts
n
)−v[w(xts)−²(ats)]−λt[w(xts)−²(ats)]−λsats . (15)
Comparing (14) and (15) is not straightforward. Which policy is better depends on
the extent of the distortion due to imperfect competition in the eco-industry (which is
driven by the number n of environment firms), compared to the negative externality from
pollution (captured by v) and the cost of public fund transfers (given by λ).
Some ranges of parameter values that make one policy better than the other are
6There is no point here in examining a policy consisting of an environmental subsidy only. Without
an emission tax (or any other regulatory constraint), the representative polluter’s demand for abatement
would vanish and all specialized producers of abatement goods and services would cease to exist.
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depicted in Figure 1. The computations which support this figure can be found in the
appendix; they use the peculiar functional forms P (x) = 10− x, C(x) = 1
2
x2, G(a) = a,
and e(x, a) = x−
√
a. The first graph concerns smaller values of λ, and the second graph
Insert Figure 1 about here
larger ones (i.e., λ1 > λ0). The area labelled with the letter T corresponds to the values
of n, v, and λ for which using the emission tax alone is more eﬃcient. The region tagged
as TS, on the other hand, spans the ranges of parameter values for which the tax should
rather go with a subsidy. The hatched area, finally, indicates the circumstances when,
given the cost of public intervention, neither a tax nor a subsidy should be applied. Some
key conclusions to be drawn from the figure are now summarized in our last proposition.
Proposition 3: Combining an emission tax and a subsidy to the eco-industry is more
eﬃcient than using an emission tax alone when the number of firms n in the eco-industry
and the marginal social cost of pollution υ are not too high. The set of pairs (n,v) for
which a tax-subsidy scheme is more eﬃcient tends to shrink as the social cost of public
funds λ increases.
An intuitive explanation of these results would run as follows. First, observe that the
hatched area in the figure covers a region where v takes low values. Clearly, when the
negative externality caused by pollution is small relative to the social cost of public funds
λ, it is suboptimal to impose a tax on emissions given the low benefit and high cost of
such a measure. But without an emission tax, no abatement activity takes place and
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subsidizing environment firms is pointless (since these firms do not even have a market).
For low values on v, therefore, neither a tax nor a subsidy should be used. For high values
of v and n, on the other hand, social welfare would be higher under a tax on polluting
emissions with no accompanying subsidy. In this case, pollution is more detrimental
to social welfare than imperfect competition in the eco-industry (since the presence of a
high number of environment firms means that competition in the eco-industry is relatively
strong), so the regulator should concentrate on dealing with the environmental externality
given the cost of handling public funds. In contrast, when n is rather small, the distortion
caused by an imperfectly competitive eco-industry becomes significant enough to make
the tax-subsidy worthwhile. The area where such a combination is finally preferable
decreases as λ increases, since the combination of both instruments becomes then more
costly compared to a tax-only policy.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper investigated the combination of an emission tax and an environmental
subsidy when abatement goods and services are supplied by an imperfectly competitive
eco-industry. The environmental economics literature has implicitly assumed so far that
abatement subsidies can only be granted to polluters. We just showed that such a policy
could hardly implement the first-best in the presence of an oligopolistic environment in-
dustry. A much cheaper way to do so is to subsidize environment firms, not the polluters.
If public transfers are also subject to significant administrative costs, however, the reg-
14
ulator will want to suppress all environment subsidies when the number of environment
firms is relatively large (so competition in the eco-industry remains strong).
The policy of subsidizing abatement eﬀorts may need further qualifications after one
considers general equilibrium eﬀects (Parry 1997) or international trade agreements. Our
basic conclusions, however, seem to hold under more realistic assumptions concerning the
eco-industry, such as free entry or monopolistic competition. Studying the consequences
of other relevant and more complex industry structures, however, (with asymmetric en-
vironment firms or when polluters are also able to make their own abatement goods,
notably) will require additional research.
Appendix
I Robustness of Proposition 1 with free entry
Assume there is free entry in the eco-industry and any producer of abatement goods
and services incurs a fixed cost F . The profit of a firm in the environment industry is
now
Πi = q(a)ai −G(ai)− F .
In this case, the first-order condition for profit maximization is
q(a) = G0 +
a
n
(− 1
a0
) , (16)
where a0 = ∂a
∂q
< 0, and the number of firms in the eco-industry is determined by the
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zero-profit condition
q(a)ai −G(ai)− F = 0 .
When the regulator implements an emission tax and an abatement subsidy to polluting
firms, the profit of a typical polluter is
π = Px− C(x)− qa− t[w(x)− ²(a)] + sa ,
which yields the following first-order conditions for profit maximization
P − C 0(x)− tw0(x) = 0
−q + t²0(a) + s = 0 . (17)
In order to achieve the first-best, the regulator would then have to set
t∗ = v
s∗ = q −G0. (18)
By equation (2), the latter is equivalent to s∗ = a
n
(− 1
a0 ). The derivative a
0 comes from
totally diﬀerentiating equation (17) and is equal to a0 =
1− ds
dq
t²00 . Equation (18) implies that
ds
dq
= 1, so a0 has to be very small and the optimal subsidy s∗ must again be unbounded.
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I Social welfare with a tax-only policy, when public transfers are costly
Using the functional forms P (x) = 10−x, C(x) = 1
2
x2, G(a) = a, and e(x, a) = x−
√
a,
the polluting firm’s output and abatement demand when facing a tax t are respectively
xt =
10− t
2
, at = (
t
2q
)2 . (19)
The derivative a0t =
∂at
∂q
is thus given by
a0t = −
t2
2q3
.
Given these expressions, the equilibrium price of abatement goods and services is
qt =
2n
2n− 1 ,
and the corresponding purchases by the representative polluter amount to
at =
t2(2n− 1)2
16n2
.
Recall now that social welfare is given by
W t =
Z xt
0
P (u)du− C(xt)− nG(a
t
n
)− v[w(xt)− ²(at)]− λt[w(xt)− ²(at)] .
Maximizing this function with respect to t under the constraint t ≥ 0, taking into account
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the reactions xt and at indicated in (19), yields the following formula for the optimal tax
tT (λ, v, n) =
8(v − 5λ)n2 − 2vn
8n2(1− 2λ)− 4n(1− λ) + 1 (20)
if this expression is positive, and tT (λ, v, n) = 0 otherwise. The optimal welfare under a
tax-only policy is then obtained by substitution.
IWelfare with the tax-subsidy policy, when public transfers are costly
Here, the representarive polluter’s output and abatement demand are respectively
given by
xt =
10− t
2
, at = (
t
2q
)2 , (21)
and the derivative
a0 = − t
2
2q3
.
Given these expressions, and the eco-industry’s behavior in this case as characterized by
equation (12), the equilibrium price for abatement goods and services becomes
qt =
2n(1− s)
2n− 1 ,
so the associated quantity of procured abatement products is
at =
t2(2n− 1)2
16n2(1− s)2 .
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Now, social welfare can be represented as
W ts =
Z xts
0
P (u)du−C(xts)− nG(a
ts
n
)− v[w(xts)− ²(ats)]− λt[w(xts)− ²(ats)]− λsats .
Maximizing this function with respect to s and t, given nonnegativity constraints and the
reactions xt and at shown in (21), gives the following equations
−4v − 4tλ+ (2n− 1)t
n(1− s) (2 + λ+ sλ) = 0 ,
2(2n− 1)v + 4[(v − 10λ)n(1− s) + (2n− 1)tλ]
+
t
n(1− s)[−1− sλ+ 4n(1 + sλ) + 4n
2(s(2− 5λ) + 2(−1 + λ) + s2(−1 + 2λ))] = 0 .
Solving this system yields the optimal subsidy
sTS(λ, v, n) =
8λ(3v + 5λ− 10)n2 + (20λ2 + 40λ− 10λv − 4v)n+ λv
4(30λ2 + λv − 2v)n2 + 2λ(v − 10λ)n
(22)
if this expression is positive (sTS(λ, v, n) = 0 otherwise), and the optimal emission tax
tTS(λ, v, n) =
n2(160λ(1 + λ)− 8v(5λ+ 2)) + 4λvn
4n2(17λ2 + 4λ− 4)− 12λ2n+ λ2
(23)
if this ratio is positive (or else tTS(λ, v, n) = 0). Optimal welfare levels under a tax-subsidy
policy can then be computed by substitution.
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Figure 1. Tax alone vs. tax-subsidy combination
